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Abstract
Concept blending, a cognitive process which allows for
the combination of certain elements (and their relations)
from originally distinct conceptual spaces into a new
unified space combining these previously separate ele-
ments and allowing the performance of reasoning and
inference over the combination, is taken as a key ele-
ment of creative thought and combinatorial creativity.
In this paper, we provide an intermediate report on work
towards the development of a computational-level and
algorithmic-level account of concept blending, present-
ing the theoretical background together with the main
model characteristics, as well as two case studies.
Creativity and Concept Blending
The term “combinatorial creativity” (Boden 2003) refers to
creativity which arises from a combinatorial process join-
ing familiar ideas (in the form of, for instance, concepts,
theories, or artworks) in an unfamiliar way, thereby produc-
ing novel ideas. But although the overall idea of combining
preexisting ideas into new ones seems fairly intuitive and
straightforward, computationally modeling this form of cre-
ativity turns out to be surprisingly complicated: When look-
ing at it from a more formal perspective at the current stage
neither can a precise algorithmic characterization be given,
nor are at least the details of a possible computational-level
theory describing the process(es) at work well understood.
Still, in recent years a proposal by (Fauconnier and Turner
1998) called concept blending (or conceptual integration)
has influenced and reinvigorated studies trying to unravel
the general cognitive principles operating during creative
thought. In their theory, concept blending constitutes a cog-
nitive process which allows for the combination of certain
elements (and their relations) from originally distinct con-
ceptual spaces into a new unified space combining these pre-
viously separate elements and allowing the performance of
reasoning and inference over the combination.
Unfortunately, a proper computational modeling of con-
cept blending as cognitive capacity again is lacking. Neither
do (Fauconnier and Turner 1998) provide a fully worked out
and formalized theory themselves, nor does their informal
account capture key properties and functionalities as, for ex-
ample, the retrieval of input spaces, the selection and trans-
fer of elements from the input into the blend space, or the
further combination of possibly mutually contradictory ele-
ments in the blend.
These shortcomings notwithstanding, several researchers
in AI and computational cognitive modeling have used
the provided conceptual descriptions as a starting point
for proposing possible refinements and implementations:
(Goguen and Harrell 2010) propose a concept blending-
based approach to the analysis of the style of multime-
dia content in terms of blending principles and also pro-
vide an experimental implementation, (Pereira 2007) tries
to develop a computationally plausible model of several
hypothesized sub-parts of concept blending, (Thagard and
Stewart 2011) exemplify how creative thinking could arise
from using convolution to combine neural patterns into ones
which are potentially novel and useful, and (Veale and
O’Donoghue 2000) present their computational model of
conceptual integration and propose several extensions to the
(at that time prevailing) view on concept blending.
Since 2013, another attempt at developing a computation-
ally feasible, cognitively-inspired formal model of concept
creation, grounded on a sound mathematical theory of con-
cepts and implemented in a generic, creative computational
system is undertaken by a European research consortium
in the so called Concept Invention Theory (COINVENT)
project (Schorlemmer et al. 2014)1. One of the main goals
of the COINVENT research program is the development
of a computational-level and algorithmic-level account of
concept blending based on insights from psychology, AI,
and cognitive modeling, the heart of which are made up
by results from cognitive systems studies on computational
analogy-making and knowledge transfer and combination
(i.e., the computation of so called amalgams) from case-
based reasoning. In the following we present an analogy-
inspired perspective on the COINVENT core model for con-
cept blending and show how the respective mechanisms and
systems interact.
Two Mechanisms at the Heart of COINVENT:
Generalization-Based Analogy and Amalgams
As analogy seems to play a crucial role in human cogni-
tion (Gentner and Smith 2013), researchers on the computa-
1Also see http://www.coinvent-project.eu for de-
tails on the consortium and the project.
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tional side of cognitive science and in AI also very quickly
got interested in the topic and have been creating computa-
tional models of analogy-making since the advent of com-
puter systems, among others giving rise to (Winston 1980)’s
work on analogy and learning, (Hofstadter and Mitchell
1994)’s Copycat system, or (Falkenhainer, Forbus, and Gen-
tner 1989)’s well-known Structure-Mapping Engine (SME).
Generally speaking there are (at least) two families of
computational analogy models: one family is based on a
(generalization-free) direct mapping approach, the other one
relies on a two-step procedure with a generalization stage
followed by a subsequent mapping stage. While the for-
mer type of analogy engine is, among others, exemplified
in the SME and its immediate pairwise mapping of domain
elements between elements of source and target of the po-
tential analogy, followed by the accumulation of individ-
ual mappings into more complex structures, the latter cat-
egory is represented by the Heuristic-Driven Theory Projec-
tion (HDTP) framework (Schmidt et al. 2014). As COIN-
VENT, for principled conceptual reasons (see the section on
the idea(s) behind concept blending in COINVENT below),
relies on the generalization-based view on analogy-making,
we shortly introduce this model category in the following
subsection.
In a conceptually related, but mostly independently con-
ducted line of work researchers in case-based reasoning
(CBR) have been trying to develop problem solving method-
ologies based on the principle that similar problems tend to
have similar solutions. CBR tries to solve problems by re-
trieving one or several cases relevant for the issue at hand
from a case-base with already solved previous problems
(cases), and then reusing the past case(s) to also solve the
new task (Aamodt and Plaza 1994). While the retrieval
stage has received significant attention over the last two
decades, the transfer and combination of knowledge from
the retrieved case to the current problem has been studied
in an domain-specific way, with (Ontano´n and Plaza 2012)
being a recent attempt at also gaining insights on this phase
of the CBR cycle by suggesting the framework of amalgams
(Ontano´n and Plaza 2010) as a formal model for reuse of
multiple cases. The second subsection gives an overview of
amalgams as used in COINVENT.
Generalization-Based Models of Analogy
Generalization-based models of analogy-making share a
close conceptual connection to models of inductive gener-
alization (Smaling 2003). Similar to these, the basic prin-
ciple is the recognition of a common core between source
and target of the potential analogy, which is then used for
guiding the formation process of the analogy and the sub-
sequent content transfer and reasoning steps. Fig. 1 gives a
schematic overview: The common conceptual elements be-
tween source S and target T correspond to a shared gen-
eralization G (subsuming both, S and T ), which also in-
duces mappings between the respective domain elements,
establishing an analogical relation. These mappings, gov-
erned by the generalization, then also subsequently define
how (previously unmatched) knowledge from the source do-
main can be transferred to and integrated into the target do-
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Figure 1: A schematic overview of a generalization-based
approach to analogy.
main, namely by converting elements from S into their cor-
responding counterparts within T .
The precise nature of the subsumption relation between
generalization and source or target domain, respectively,
is defined by the specific analogy model, possibly ranging
from semantic subsumption in a suitable ontology, through
taxonomic subsumption based on names and labels, logical
subsumption in a model-theoretic sense, to purely syntactic
subsumption in a formal language.
One example for a generalization-based computational
analogy-model (and the system used in COINVENT) is
the already aforementioned HDTP (Schmidt et al. 2014).
The framework has been conceived as a mathematically
sound theoretical model and implemented engine for com-
putational analogy-making, on a syntax basis computing
analogical relations and inferences for domains which are
presented in (when allowing for re-representation possibly
different) many-sorted first-order logic (FOL) languages.
Source and target domains are handed over to the system
in terms of finite axiomatizations and HDTP tries to com-
pute a generalization between both domains. This is done by
aligning pairs of formulae from the two domains by means
of restricted higher-order anti-unification (Schwering et al.
2009): Given two terms, one from each domain, HDTP
computes an anti-instance in which distinct subterms have
been replaced by variables so that the anti-instance can be
seen as a meaningful generalization of the input terms. As
already indicated by the name, the class of admissible sub-
stitution operations is limited. On each expression, only re-
namings, fixations, argument insertions, and permutations
may be performed. By this process, HDTP tries to find
the least general generalization of the input terms, which
(due to the higher-order nature of the anti-unification) is not
unique. In order to solve this problem, current implementa-
tions of HDTP rank possible generalizations according to a
complexity measure on the chain of substitutions — the re-
spective values of which are taken as heuristic costs — and
returns the least expensive solution as the preferred one.
HDTP extends the notion of generalization from terms to
formulae by basically treating formulae in clause form and
terms alike. Finally, as analogies rarely rely exclusively on
one isolated pair of formulae from source and target domain,
but usually encompass sets of formulae (possibly completely
covering one or even both input domains), a process itera-
tively selecting pairs of formulae for generalization has been
included. The selection of formulae is again based on a
heuristic component. Mappings in which substitutions can
be reused get assigned a lower cost than isolated substitu-
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tions, leading to a preference for coherent over incoherent
mappings.
Due to the use of many-sorted FOL as an expressive rep-
resentation language, and the purely syntax-based general-
ization approach underlying HDTP, over the last years the
framework has shown remarkable generalizability and gen-
erality. Having originally been conceived and applied for
modelling the Rutherford analogy and poetic metaphors, as
well as for providing an alternate account of (Falkenhainer,
Forbus, and Gentner 1989)’s heat-flow analogy in (Schwer-
ing et al. 2009), without major changes to the model HDTP
has by now been applied to different tasks from different do-
mains, such as modeling a potential inductive analogy-based
process for establishing the fundamental concepts of arith-
metics (Guhe et al. 2010), or studies applying the framework
to modeling analogy use in education and teaching situations
(Besold 2014).
Combining Conceptual Theories Using Amalgams
The notion of amalgams was developed in the context of
CBR (Ontano´n and Plaza 2010), where new problems are
solved based on previously solved problems (or cases, resid-
ing on a case base). Solving a new problem often requires
more than one case from the case base, so their content has to
be combined in some way to solve the new problem. The no-
tion of an amalgam of two cases (two descriptions of prob-
lems and their solutions) is a proposal to formalize the ways
in which cases can be combined to produce a new, coherent
case.
Formally, the notion of amalgams can be defined in any
representation language L for which a subsumption relation
v between the formulae (or descriptions) of L can be de-
fined. We say that a description I1 subsumes another de-
scription I2 (I1 v I2) when I1 is more general (or equal)
than I2. Additionally, we assume that L contains the infi-
mum element ? (or ‘any’), and the supremum element >
(or ‘none’) with respect to the subsumption order.
Next, for any two descriptions I1 and I2 in L we can
define their unification, (I1 t I2), which is the most gen-
eral specialization of two given descriptions, and their anti-
unification, (I1 u I2), defined as the least general general-
ization of two descriptions, representing the most specific
description that subsumes both. Intuitively, a unifier is a
description that has all the information in both the original
descriptions; if joining this information leads to inconsis-
tency, this is equivalent to saying that I1 t I2 = > (i.e., they
have no common specialization except ‘none’). The anti-
unification I1uI2 contains all that is common to both I1 and
I2; when they have nothing in common, then I1 u I2 = ?.
Depending on L anti-unification and unification might be
unique or not.
The notion of an amalgam can be conceived of as a gener-
alization of the notion of unification: as ‘partial unification’
(Ontano´n and Plaza 2010). Unification means that what is
true for I1 or I2 is also true for I1tI2; e.g., if I1 describes ‘a
red vehicle’ and I2 describes ‘a German minivan’ then their
unification yields a common specialization like ‘a red Ger-
man minivan.’ Two descriptions may contain information
that produces an inconsistency when unified; for instance
I1 I2
I¯2I¯1
G = I1 u I2
A = I¯1 t I¯2
v
v
v
vvv
v v
Figure 2: A diagram of an amalgamA from inputs I1 and I2
where A = I¯1 t I¯2.
v
vvv
v v
A = S0 t T
S0
S
T
G = S u T
Figure 3: A diagram that transfers content from source S to
a target T via an asymmetric amalgam A.
‘a red French sedan’ and ‘a blue German minivan’ have
no common specialization except >. An amalgam of two
descriptions is a new description that contains parts from
these two descriptions. For instance, an amalgam of ‘a red
French sedan’ and ‘a blue German minivan’ is ‘a red Ger-
man sedan’; clearly there are always multiple possibilities
for amalgams, like ‘a blue French minivan’.
For the purposes of this paper we can define an amalgam
of two input descriptions as follows:
Definition 1 (Amalgam) A description A 2 L is an amal-
gam of two inputs I1 and I2 (with anti-unification G =
I1 u I2) if there exist two generalizations I¯1 and I¯2 such
that (1)G v I¯1 v I1, (2)G v I¯2 v I2, and (3) A = I¯1t I¯2
When I¯1 and I¯2 have no common specialization then triv-
ially A = >, since their only unifier is “none”. For our
purpose we will be only interested in non-trivial amalgams.
This definition is illustrated in Fig. 2, where the anti-
unification of the inputs is indicated as G, and the amalgam
A is the unification of two concrete generalizations I¯1 and
I¯2 of the inputs. Equality here should be understood as v-
equivalence: X ⌘ Y iff X v Y and Y v X . Convention-
ally, we call the space of amalgams of I1 and I2 the set of
all amalgams A that satisfy Definition 1.
Usually we are interested only in maximal amalgams of
two input descriptions, i.e., those amalgams that contain
maximal parts of their inputs that can be unified into a new
coherent description. Formally, an amalgam A of inputs I1
and I2 is maximal if there is no other non-trivial amalgam
A0 of inputs I1 and I2 such that A @ A0. The reason why
we are interested in maximal amalgams is very simple: a
non-maximal amalgam A¯ @ A preserves less compatible
information from the inputs than the maximal amalgam A.
Conversely, any non-maximal amalgam A¯ can be obtained
by generalizing a maximal amalgam A, since A¯ @ A.
There is a special case of particular interest that is called
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an asymmetric amalgam, in which the two inputs play differ-
ent roles. The inputs are called source and target, and while
the source is allowed to be generalized, the target is not.
Definition 2 (Asymmetric Amalgam) An asymmetric
amalgam A 2 L of two inputs S (source) and T (target)
satisfies that A = S0 t T for some generalization of the
source S0 v S.
As shown in Fig. 3, the content of target T is transferred
completely into the asymmetric amalgam, while the source
S is generalized. The result is a form of partial unification
that preserves all information in T while relaxing S by gen-
eralization and then unifying one of those generalizations S0
with T itself. As before, we will usually be interested in
maximal amalgams: in this case, a maximal amalgam cor-
responds to transferring maximal content from S to T while
keeping the resulting amalgam A consistent. For these rea-
sons asymmetric amalgams can be seen as models of a form
of analogical inference, transferring information from the
source to the target by creating a new amalgam that enriches
the latter with the content of S0 (Ontano´n and Plaza 2012).
Analogy-Based Concept Blending in
COINVENT
Taking the concept of generalization-based analogies (and
HDTP as suitable framework for the computation of the lat-
ter) together with the notion of asymmetric amalgams, we
now can introduce the core idea(s) behind concept blending
as performed in COINVENT in the next subsection, subse-
quently also showing the feasibility of the approach in two
examples. The general suitability of the approach is demon-
strated revisiting the “sign forest” metaphor from (Kutz et
al. 2012), an implementation using HDTP is exemplified
(re-)constructing the concept of a foldable toothbrush.
The Core Model: An Analogy-Inspired View
One of the early formal accounts on concept blending, which
is especially influential to the approach applied in COIN-
VENT, is the classical work by Goguen using notions from
algebraic specification and category theory (Goguen 2006).
This version of concept blending can be described by the di-
agram in Fig. 4, where each node stands for a representation
an agent has of some concept or conceptual domain. We will
call these representations “conceptual spaces” and in some
cases abuse terminology by using the word “concept” to re-
ally refer to its representation by the agent. The arrows stand
for morphisms, that is, functions that preserve at least part of
the internal structure of the related conceptual spaces. The
idea is that, given two conceptual spaces I1 and I2 as input,
we look for a generalization G and then construct a blend
space B in such a way as to preserve as many as possible
structural alignments between I1 and I2 established by the
generalization. This may involve taking the functions to B
to be partial, in that not all the structure from I1 and I2
might be mapped to B. In any case, as the blend respects (to
the largest possible extent) the relationship between I1 and
I2, the diagram will commute.
Concept invention by concept blending can then be
phrased as the following task: given two representations of
G
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Figure 4: A conceptual overview of (Goguen 2006)’s ac-
count of conceptual blending.
two domain theories I1 and I2, we need first, to compute a
generalized theory G of I1 and I2 (which codes the com-
monalities between I1 and I2) and second, to compute the
blend theory B in a structure preserving way such that new
properties hold in B. Ideally, these new properties in B are
considered to be (moderately) interesting properties. In what
follows, for reasons of simplicity and without loss of gener-
ality we assume that the additional properties are just pro-
vided by one of the two domains, i.e., we align the situation
with a standard setting in computational analogy-making by
renaming I1 and I2. The domain providing the additional
properties for the concept blend will be called source S, the
domain providing the conceptual basis and receiving the ad-
ditional features will be called target T .
In COINVENT’s account, the reasoning process is then
triggered by the computation of the generalization G
(generic space), where for concept invention we will only
need the mapping mechanism and replace the transfer phase
by a new blending algorithm. The mapping is achieved via
the usual generalization process between S and T , in which
a generalized theory is created that reflects common aspects
of both spaces. The generalized theory can be projected
back into the original spaces by specializations  S and  T ,
respectively. As S and T might contain elements which
are not reflected in the shared generalization, it holds that
 S(G) ✓ S and  T (G) ✓ T . While in analogy making the
analogical relations are used in the transfer phase to translate
additional uncovered knowledge from the source to the tar-
get space, blending combines additional facts (i.e., elements
from S \ SC or T \ TC) from one or both spaces. Therefore
the process of blending can build on the generalization and
specializations provided by the analogy engine, but has to
include a new mechanism for transfer and concept combi-
nation. Here, amalgams naturally come into play: The set
of specializations can be inverted and applied to generalize
the original source theory S into a more general version S0
(forming a superset of the shared generalization G, also in-
cluding previously uncovered knowledge from the source)
which then can be combined into an asymmetric amalgam
with the target theory T , forming the (possibly underspeci-
fied) proto-blend T 0 of both. In a final step, T 0 is then com-
pleted into the blended theory and output of the process TB
by applying corresponding specialization steps stored from
the generalization process between S and T (see also Fig. 5).
If we now take the domains to be represented in the form
of finite axiomatizations as processed by HDTP, in an im-
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Figure 5: A general overview of COINVENT’s account of concept blending using generalization-based analogy and asymmetric
amalgams: The shared generalization G from S and T is computed with  S(G) = Sc. The relation  S is subsequently re-used
in the generalization of S into S0, which is then combined in an asymmetric amalgam with T into the proto-blend T 0 = S0 t T
and finally, by application of  T , completed into the blended output theory TB . (Herev indicates subsumption between theories
in the direction of the respective arrows.)
plementation of the general model we can use the analogy-
engine for computing the generalizations and deriving the
corresponding substitutions. In the generalization step be-
tween S and T , as usual pairs of formulas from the source
and target spaces are anti-unified for deriving the general-
ized theory G, and the specializations  S and  T become
substitutions which are computed during anti-unification.
Example 1: The Sign Forest
We now want to revisit the example of the blend sign for-
est discussed in (Kutz et al. 2012), providing an interpre-
tation of the concept from a metaphor-centered perspective
and showing how the general COINVENT model can serve
for reconstructing the blending process. In what follows we
consider sign forest equivalent to the expression “a forest of
signs”, that shows more clearly its metaphorical nature.
The original sign forest blend was defined in the context
of blending ontologies, which means that the involved inputs
for blending were ontological descriptions of trees, forests,
and (traffic) signs. This approach views a concept such as
tree defined as an ontological specification of the concept of
tree: a specification that is ideally so general as to cover all
kinds of trees; the same can be said about forest, and (traffic)
signs. As such, certain properties and relations are selected
to form these specifications that are useful for an ontology
framework. However, our approach follows the notion that
concepts in human cognition can often be viewed, in cog-
nitive science, as bundles of their most typical properties
(albeit typicality may certainly be context-dependent). This
view is also taken in examples by (Fauconnier and Turner
1998) that are used to show how conceptual blending works:
a boathouse has typical properties of boat and house —but
not other properties that may appear in an ontological spec-
ification of boat and house.
Thus, in this approach, the concept of tree is typically
formed by a plant having roots, a trunk and a crown (even if
there may be plants categorized as trees that do not have a
trunk, this is ignored as it does not belong to the bundle of
properties that are typical); this view is depicted as I2 in the
bottom right of Fig. 6, where other properties are included,
like plants being not mobile and the roots fixing the (typical)
tree to the ground. Finally, a forest is commonsensically de-
fined as a group of trees. The second concept, (traffic) sign,
may come in many forms (as we know from own experi-
ence), but the first that comes to mind is the most typical one:
the signpost. The signpost is typically fixed on the ground
near a road, and has a post supporting a surface panel depict-
ing some traffic related information (labeled I1 in the lower
left corner of Fig. 6). The cognitive advantage of a signpost
is that it has a recognizable physical structure, while “traffic
sign” is so generic as to be a merely functional-based con-
cept: any kind of surface panel depicting some traffic-related
information is a traffic sign.
The generic space G of conceptual blending corresponds
to the anti-unification shown as G = I1 u I2 in Fig. 6;
G depicts common structure between a signpost and a tree:
a stem-like object, fixed to the ground, and supporting an-
other object on top. As discussed later, this common struc-
ture is the basis for a metaphor like “a forest of signs” to
make sense — in contradistinction to a metaphor that does
not make sense such as “a forest of chairs”, even when a
typical chair is made of wood.
Now, the construction of the blended metaphor for
sign forest can be interpreted easily in the combined
generalization-based analogy and amalgam framework: the
input spaces can be generalized in different ways (al-
though always satisfying what they already have in com-
mon, namely G). Different generalizations would yield dif-
ferent amalgams, but the one we are considering here can be
seen as generalizing I2 into I¯2, as shown in Fig. 6. Now
this generalization I¯2 can directly be unified with I1, since
I¯1 is identical to I1; this unification yields the amalgam
A = I¯1 t I¯2 that, as shown in Fig. 6, represents a “for-
est of signposts”. Moreover, since I1 ⌘ I¯1, this model is an
asymmetric amalgam, as evidenced by the fact we general-
ize the source (Forest) until it unifies with the target (Sign-
post), while the latter remains fixed (i.e., is not generalized).
In order to support our perspective that a metaphor
(viewed as an analogy and amalgam combination in natu-
ral language) is based on some (strong enough) common
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Figure 6: Blending schema for “Sign Forest” when inputs are typical concepts for “Sign” (traffic signpost) and “Forest” (forest
of typical trees); the arrows indicate subsumption (v) as in Figure 2.
structure of the typical concepts participating in the blending
process, we checked if other metaphors can be constructed,
or better yet, have already been constructed, that are based
on the same kind of generic space G. We used Google’s n-
grams database to search for existing phrases in which “for-
est of X” is used metaphorically2. Most n-grams starting
with “forest of” were about places or kinds of trees, as is to
be expected; still, we found the following metaphors used
on the web: (1) forest of spears, (2) forest of masts, and (3)
forest of marble columns. These three cases have a generic
space that is very similar to G: they all represent a mul-
titude of vertical stem-like objects. Some differences are:
while masts and columns are fixed, spears are not fixed to
the ground, but may be used in a context where they are ver-
tical and immobile stems, supporting a pointed tip; masts
2Google’s 3-grams starting with “fo” are available at: http:
//storage.googleapis.com/books/ngrams/books/
googlebooks-eng-all-3gram-20120701-fo.gz
and columns support different kinds of objects, but all three
examples have generic spaces resembling G in Fig. 6.
What about counterexamples? We did not find “forest of
chairs” of course, and there were other metaphors on forest,
but they were based on different generic spaces and differ-
ent input spaces; we found these metaphors: “forest of X”,
where X could be opinions, possibilities, desires, words, hu-
man experience. Clearly, these metaphors were not based on
the trees being elements of a “forest”, but on the human ex-
perience of (walking in) the forest as a place of multiplicity
of paths, options, destinations. We think they are not coun-
terexamples, but rather examples of blends from different
input spaces.
Example 2: The Folding Toothbrush
Having given an example for the general model in the pre-
vious subsection, we now want to also exemplify a con-
crete implementation of the approach using HDTP as anal-
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Figure 7: Brillo, an example of a foldable toothbrush as pro-
duced by Metaphys.
ogy framework. As application example, we will use the
blending-driven (re-)invention of foldable toothbrushes as,
for instance, the one depicted in Fig. 7.
Currently, when using HDTP, the required subsumption
relation between theories is given by logical semantic con-
sequence |=, i.e., A v A0 if A0 |= A for any two theo-
ries A and A0. In order to make sure that this relationship
is preserved by HDTP’s syntax-based operations, the range
of admissible substitutions for restricted higher-order anti-
unifications has to be further constrained to only allow for
fixations and renamings.
Foldable toothbrushes are a conceptual combination be-
tween a typical toothbrush and a folding mechanism like
that of pocketknives. In order to reconstruct the underlying
blending process, we start with the stereotypical characteri-
zations of a toothbrush and a pocketknife in a many-sorted
first-order logic representation from Table 1.
Sorts:
entity, part, functionality
Entities:
toothbrush, pocketknife : entity handle, brush head, blade, hinge : part
brush, cut, fold : functionality
Predicates:
has part : entity⇥ part, has functionality : entity⇥ functionality
Laws of the pocketknife characterization:
(↵1) has part(pocketknife, handle) (↵2) has part(pocketknife, blade)
(↵3) has functionality(pocketknife, cut) (↵4) has part(pocketknife, hinge)
(↵5) has functionality(pocketknife, fold)
Laws of the horse characterization:
( 1) has part(toothbrush, handle) ( 2) has part(toothbrush, brush head)
( 3) has functionality(toothbrush, brush)
Table 1: Example formalizations of stereotypical character-
izations for a pocketknife S and a toothbrush T .
Given these characterizations, HDTP can be used for
finding a common generalization of both, for instance (due
to the syntactic similarities and the system’s heuristics)
aligning and generalizing ↵1 with  1, ↵2 with  2, and ↵3
with  3. Subsequently, reusing the same anti-unifications
(corresponding to  S), the source theory S is generalized
into S0 as given in Table 2:  1 corresponds to ↵1/ 1,  2 to
↵2/ 2,  3 to ↵3/ 3, and  4 and  5 are obtained by general-
izing ↵4 and ↵5, respectively.
Entities:
E : entity, P : part, F : functionality
Laws:
( 1) has part(E, handle) ( 2) has part(E,P )
( 3) has functionality(E,F )
( 4⇤) has part(E, hinge) ( 5⇤) has functionality(E, fold)
Table 2: Abbreviated representation of the generalized
source theory S0 based on the stereotypical characterizations
for a toothbrush and a pocketknife (axioms not obtained
from the covered subset Sc are highlighted by *).
Computing the asymmetric amalgam of S0 with the
(fixed) target theory T , we obtain the proto-blend T 0 from
Table 3. As T 0 still features axioms containing non-
instantiated variables,  T is applied to the theory resulting in
the (with respect to  T ) fully instantiated blend theory TB
from Table 4, describing the concept of a hinge-equipped
toothbrush that can be folded.
Entities:
E : entity
Laws:
( 1) has part(toothbrush, handle) ( 2) has part(toothbrush, brush head)
( 3) has functionality(toothbrush, brush)
( 4) has part(E, hinge) ( 5) has functionality(E, fold)
Table 3: Abbreviated representation of the proto-blend T 0
obtained from computing the asymmetric amalgam between
S0 and T .
Laws:
( 1) has part(toothbrush, handle) ( 2) has part(toothbrush, brush head)
( 3) has functionality(toothbrush, brush)
( 4) has part(toothbrush, hinge) ( 5) has functionality(toothbrush, fold)
Table 4: Abbreviated representation of TB =  T (T 0).
Conclusions
We presented a perspective on the blending of concept theo-
ries building on generalization-based analogy and the amal-
gam framework: Building upon analogy models of general-
ization and domain matching, asymmetric amalgams allow
to provide a sound model for the controlled computation of
the concept blend(s) of two input theories.
Clearly, this is not the only attempt at developing a com-
putational model of (some facet of) concept blending: (Mar-
tinez et al. 2014) present an algorithmic approach for blend-
ing mathematical theories, (Kutz et al. 2015) give an account
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of ontological blending, (Li et al. 2012) describe the goal-
and context-sensitive blending-based production of creative
artifacts, and (Martinez et al. 2012) consider concept blend-
ing in a human-level AI context. Still, in combining the
generality of generalization-based analogies and the amal-
gam framework, COINVENT’s approach stands out as high-
level, cognitively-inspired perspective on concept blending.
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